Ukrainian is a language which has been historically overshadowed by Russian for centuries. In fact, as long ago as the 17th century, the Russian diaspora has continually attempted to suppress and eradicate the language, as a part of their attempts to destroy Ukrainian national identity. However, it has also become more recently clear that Ukrainian is changing from the language of the oppressed, to a language of resistance. Following Russia’s invasion of the country, the use of Ukrainian has increased dramatically. Discredited and delegitimised by Russia for centuries as part of attempts to russify the country, it might be viewed as one of the most pertinent examples of how integral language is to cultural identity.
The Relationship between Russia and the Ukrainian Language
According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Muscovy (the historical predecessor state of Russia) has historically attempted to ban their language upwards of 130 times. Most recently, in June of 2025, when Russia attempted to ban the teaching of Ukrainian in schools situated in the occupied regions of the country.
Since 2014, a well-established campaign of the destruction of Ukrainian literature has continued as part of the invasion of Ukraine. In the Donetsk and Luhansk regions they are said to be seizing and burning books from libraries and schools. In Kherson, teachers observe that Russia specifically targets Ukrainian language books. The destruction of these books is often followed by an influx of Russian-language literature imposed by the occupiers, in an attempt to eradicate the Ukrainian language. By attempting to force the use of Russian in public, education and even
governmental settings, Russia wishes to enforce it as the primary language of the country. Alongside this, there is clear evidence of Russia’s effort to control Ukrainian national identity through language. In the Soviet Union, Ukrainians were often forcibly registered as Russians in their passports, and Russian suffixes, such as -ов (-ov) or -ев (-ev), were added to the end of surnames, in an attempt to russify them. This effective method of linguistic oppression is still used by Russia to this day. More drastically, some of Putin’s officials even deny the existence of a Ukrainian language as one distinct from Russian, instead referring to it as a dialect of Russian. However far back in Russian history you go, the traditionally propagated definition of the Ukrainian language is that it is an “inferior” version of Russian. It is partly on this falsified linguistic basis that Russia attempts to justify its invasion of the country.
Developing Conceptions of Language
However, since the annexation of Crimea, perceptions of the two languages have begun to shift dramatically. Day by day fewer people choose to speak Russian in Ukraine, with more opting for the country’s official language. In 2012, only 44% of Ukrainians considered Ukrainian to be their primary language, compared to the 34% who used Russian. By 2022, the number of people choosing Ukrainian had risen to 57.4%. In response to the discrimination experienced by Ukrainian speakers, the language has transformed from a mark of oppression to a method of maintaining cultural unity in the face of its destruction. Now, people who would have otherwise spoken Russian are actively choosing to switch to Ukrainian. Some Ukrainians even note that today’s generation is the first that no longer feels forced to switch to Russian when they move to big cities.
Research shows that following the invasion of Ukraine, its language has developed new means of describing and referring to Russia. This has taken shape first in the form of neologisms which are intended to attack Russian identity, but also in the emergence of terms which can help to describe new phenomena in Ukraine. For example, Alex Krouglov, a professor of Russian and Ukrainian at UCL, observes that the term “mobiky” was coined after the beginning of the war to describe the newly mobilised troops in Ukraine. Further to the idea that Ukrainian is developing into a language of resistance, words like “palianytsia” (a traditional type of bread) and “svitlytsia” (a specific kind of room or chamber), which are harder for non-natives (i.e. Russians) to pronounce, are becoming more common. Through this intentional linguistic means, Ukraine can be said to be resisting the invasion of Russia, working against Putin’s intention to unite Russia with Ukraine, by distinguishing itself linguistically.
This is just one of the examples of how Ukraine is emphasising its separateness from Russia through language. Recently there has been a huge surge in the display of the letter ‘Ї’, which does not appear in the Russian language. The use of the letter, such as its appearance as graffiti in public spaces, has turned it into a symbol of national identity and of independence from Russia. It is written in chalk on buildings and appears in literature, such as Ivan Malkovych’s poem “Свічечка букви “Ї”” (Candle of the letter “Ї”), which speaks to a child, asking them to preserve the letter to secure the future of the Ukrainian language and of Ukraine itself. The letter has even been used to cover up the Russian pro-war symbol: ‘Z’ plastered on military vehicles, which the Russian Defense Ministry claims stands for “Za pobedu” (for Victory). Ukraine’s response to this symbol with their own mark of opposition tells us that the country is finding strength in their resistance to Russia through recourse to a linguistic symbol.
As a result of the increased use of the Ukrainian language, we are living in an era of linguistic upheaval in the Russian diaspora, in which Russian and Ukrainian are no longer positioned as superior and inferior respectively, but rather as languages of oppression and of resistance.
